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I
A WELL-KNOWN British authority on shipping, writing in 1927,
stated, "In no department of human activities is the contact between
nations so close and continuous as in shipping; in few lie greater pos-
sibilities of friction. . . More than this, it is destined to play no
small part in promoting the recognition of economic interdependence
and the habit of everyday, practical cooperation, on which alone can
be established a real Society of Nations." I Unfortunately, no perma-
nent inter-governmental organization exists to handle the more con-
troversial maritime matters.
There is at present a temporary body, the United Maritime Con-
sultative Council, to which fourteen maritime nations have subscribed,
but whose existence has only been provided for until the end of October
1946. The Council, which is primarily concerned with the allocation
of tonnage for relief cargoes, is composed of national delegations of the
member countries and has no administrative staff.2 With the exception
of this body, the functions of all standing inter-governmental organi-
zations are restricted in character, e.g., the International Hydrographic
Bureau and the International Commission of the Cape Spartel Light.
There have been numerous international ad hoc conventions dealing
with shipping problems, particularly with legal questions and such
technical matters as safety of life at sea, tonnage measurements, oil
pollution of the seas, etc.3 In addition there are a few intergovern-
mental bodies, such as the International Labor Organization and the
Pan-American Union, which consider limited phases of the maritime
industry as a part of their other functions. 4
The main international shipping problem, howe- er, is not the co-
ordination of technical matters and legal practices but the coordination
t Assistant professor of economics, Dartmouth College; Chief of the Cargo Reports
and Vessel Utilization Section of the War Shipping Administration, 1942-3; contributor of
articles on shipping to the Yale Review, American Economic Review, Far Eastern Survey
and other publications.
1. FAYLE, THE WAR AND THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY (1927) 400.
2. The Temporary Transport and Communications Commission of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council has recommended that the United Maritime Consultative
Council consider the possibility of transforming itself into a permanent body to handle
"technical" questions. FIRST REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
(May 25, 1946) (mimeographed) 27.
3. These included among others: construction of passenger ships, lifesaving appliances,
radiotelegraphy, load-lines, Atlantic ice patrol, buoyage and lighting of coasts. See MANCr
and WHEELER, INTERNATIONAL SEA TRANSPORT (1945) 37-48.
4. For a description of these organizations, see ibid.
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of political and economic objectives. The problem has been compli-
cated by the fact that international shipping competition, which was
largely commercial at the end of the 19th century, has become increas-
ingly political during the present century. The importance of merchant
shipping in national defense has encouraged governments to use pro-
tective measures and subsidies in an attempt to obtain incompatible
shares of the world's carrying trade for their own flag vessels. Although
such an outgrowth of uncontrolled nationalism cannot be satisfactorily
handled by private agreements, numerous non-governmental organiza-
tions have come into existence, seeking to regulate international com-
petition in the industry. Almost every liner trade has organized a
shipping conference; an International Shipping Conference was
founded in 1921 with a membership of shipowners' organizations from
the more important maritime countries; there are international asso-
ciations of tramp vessel owners. An International Maritime Com-
mittee founded in 1897 deals with legal aspects of international ship-
ping.
That these private agreements are quite inadequate stems from
the fact that the shipping industry has always been subject to rather
-violent fluctuations. Although it is impossible to forecast what the
situation will be after the more urgent relief cargoes have been carried,
there is considerable reason to believe that in spite of the encouraging
prospects for world trade, the volume of shipments will probably fall
short of utilizing available tonnage.' The dual function of shipping-
commerce and defense--will cause many nations to continue to subsi-
dize their merchant fleets and thereby contribute to the plethora of
tonnage. That the strategic requirements of many nations exceed their
commercial needs will aggravate the situation.
Therefore, the problem of adjusting the supply of shipping to demand
will in all likelihood remain a most perplexing one. Even if it be as-
sumed that much of the existing tonnage will be laid up for use in
emergencies, the penalty of obsolescence will promote continual con-
struction. If ships are necessary for national security, (and they will
be so considered as long as nations refuse to surrender any of their sov-
ereignty to a world organization, and as long as preparations for the
next war proceed on the basis of the last), modern vessels will be
demanded.
5. Variables that will affect the post-war supply of and demand for shipping are dis-
cussed in Marx, The Determination of Postwar Ocean Freight Roles (1946) 36 An. EcoN.
Rxv. 561-3; Carlson and Lytzen, Post'war Shipping-World Tonnage Araila_!e and Emerging
Policies (1946) 22 FoR. Co!Mr. WEEKLY 3, 12, 50. For a more optimistic estimate of the
demand for shipping, see Adler, British and American Shipping Policies: A Prolkm and
a Proposal (1944) 59 POL. Sci. Q. 193.
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When one considers the decreasing cost nature of ship operations
and the fact that large surpluses of shipping have been created by wars
and other non-commercial stimuli, it is not surprising that the economic
forces of competition are sometimes rather slow in adjusting the supply
of tonnage to a lower demand. Consequently, mechanisms to help
adjust supply to demand have long existed in the industry. As early
as 1875 self-preservation impelled ship-owners to organize for the pur-
pose of minimizing wasteful, cut-throat competition. Shortly before
World War I, investigations led both the American I and British 7
governments to recognize the undesirability of unrestricted competi-
tion and the advantage to be gained from cooperation in the regulation
of rates, sailings, etc. It was felt, however, that this form of coopera-
tion, the conference system, would lead to abuses if the ship-owners
were left entirely to themselves. The measures of self-regulation em-
ployed-by conference lines are not altogether confined to the fixing of
freight rates. Not infrequently, they include such cooperative arrange-
ments as the pooling of traffic or revenue. From this, it is but a step to
the substitution of monopoly profits for competitive uncertainties.
During the depressions of the 'thirties, even tramp vessels which
had hitherto always operated independently found it necessary to
resort to cooperative measures. Under the initiative of a subsidy
offered by the British Government, the Tramp Shipping Administra-
tive Committee was formed to rationalize this part of the dry cargo
industry. Through a scheme of minimum rates and payments for ves-
sels that were laid up, cooperation was secured with tramp owners in
other nations. About the same time, an International Tanker Pool
was organized to accomplish the same objectives for tankers.8
These pools marked something new in the shipping trade, and their
methods may establish useful precedents for international cooperation
in rationalizing the employment of tonnage in the future. Another
organization which may provide experience for future use is the Aus-
tralian Oversea Transport Association which combines in a single
formal organization both shippers and ship-owners. This Association
emphasizes the community of interest between the two groups, and
6. H.oR. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
7. Report of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings (1909) 47 and 48 PARL. REP.
8. The Tanker agreement provided that members pay to a pool a percentage of all
freight receipts. The proceeds of these receipts, less administrative expenses, were distrib-
uted among the vesseli which were idle, thus providing an inducement to owners to refrain
from accepting uneconomic rates. For descriptions of the operation of this pool, the Tramp
Shipping Administrative Committee, and the older but more restricted Baltic and Inter-
national Maritime Conference, see Sanderson, Control of Ocean Freight Rates in For eign
Trade (1938) DEPT. OF Com. TRADE PROMOTION SER. No. 185.
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stresses the importance of stable rates and regularity of sailings to the
majority of importers and exporters.
Rate control up to the present has been mainly a function of the
ship-owners themselves in most areas, although the influence of shippers
has been recognized in the case of the Australian Association. In
Great Britain, where the Royal Commission had recommended that
shippers form associations in order to bargain on more equal terms -ith
the shipping conferences, the formation of adequate shipper bargaining
units has been hampered by a conflict of interests between importers
and exporters and manufacturers and merchants. The difficulties ex-
perienced by the British in forming associations of shippers to deal
satisfactorily with the conferences have been far more typical than the
comparative success achieved by the Australian Oversea Transport
Association, whose problem was somewhat simplified by the fact that
only a small number of basic commodities were involved. A number
of governments have, therefore, superimposed various degrees of au-
thority for the prevention or correction of the abuses to which the
conference system was susceptible. In the United States trades, for
example, all conference and pooling arrangements are subject to reviev
by the United States Maritime Commission, as will be described in
Part III of this article.
Government control of rates in foreign trades is obviously limited
by multiple jurisdiction and possibly, to some extent, by treaty obliga-
tions. That no serious conflicts have arisen so far is due, apparently,
to the general policy of conservatism that has been exercised in the ad-
ministration of existing laws and regulations. During the recent war,
a high degree of centralized control was achieved by the War Shipping
Administration and the British Ministry of War Transport over prac-
tically all the merchant tonnage of the allied nations. A United Mari-
time Authority was finally evolved to coordinate the merchant shipping
of the United Nations, but even before V-J Day there was considerable
impatience with its restrictions in several of the smaller countries. As
a result this effort at international cooperation, which had been de-
signed for wartime rather than peacetime purposes, was terminated in
March 1946. It has been succeeded by the temporary and eviscerated
United Maritime Consultative Council.
After World War I a similar problem confronted the nations of the
world, and although international control was not seriously considered
at that time as a permanent arrangement, considerable sympathy was
expressed for the continuation of such aspects of wartime control as
might be necessary until shipping was adjusted to the post-war situa-
tion. Opposition to the continuation of international control, ho-wever,
gained the upper hand in all the victorious countries, so that the effi-
cacy of control in peacetime was neither proved nor disproved. The
result was an over-production of ships and a depressed level for freight
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rates. To prevent a repetition of this uneconomic situation and to
promote more cordial relations between the maritime nations of the
world, an international organization to coordinate the industry is again
proposed. Lord Leathers, former Minister of War Transport for the
United Kingdom, recently said that in shipping, no less than in civil
aviation, there is much to be said for internationalization as an ideal
policy. He believes that the international agreement on the pooling
and control of the merchant tonnage of the United Nations, as was
provided by the United Maritime Council, might serve as a starting-
point.' Vice Admiral Land, until recently Chairman of the United
States Maritime Commission, has also endorsed the principle of an
international organization to coordinate world shipping.
Great Britain has already accepted in principle the proposal of the
United States for an International Trade Organization to investigate
all private cartels or agreements which restrain international trade,
restrict access to international markets, or foster monopolistic con-
trols. It would seem logical to organize a comparable organization to
supervise shipping conferences and pools, inasmuch as the unique
problems of the shipping industry make a separate international con-
trol body desirable. Because of the strategic importance of merchant
shipping, it may be necessary to make this latter body responsible to
the Security Council as well as the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations. Such a division of responsibility is not ordinarily de-
sirable, and such a suggestion will doubtless encounter considerable
opposition, but the fact remains that the shipping industry has both
martial and commercial characteristics."
The Temporary Transport and Communications Commission of the
United Nations, in its first report to the Economic and Social Council,
refrained from making any recommendations concerning an interna-
tional organization for commercial matters in the field of merchant
shipping. Instead, the Report advocated an integration of activities
in the technical field, where there are already a large number of inter-
governmental agreements. The Commission, however, may have
chosen to proceed' slowly, restricting its activities for the time being to
matters concerning which there is a fairly close consensus.
Although conference and pooling arrangements have had consid-
erable success, they have not always been adequate to solve the overall
problem of the industry. The acquisition of greater authority by these
extragovernmental, cartel-like agencies would only increase the re-
sponsibility of the governments concerned to protect the shipping
public, which in the past has rarely been sufficiently well organized to
protect itself. Furthermore, to promote both commerce and security,
9. (1944) 147 THE EcoNOMIST 483.
10. Since reaching these conclusions the author has found that rather similar sugges-
tions are made by MANCE and WHEELER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 149-71.
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international competition in the building and maintenance of mer-
cantile fleets must be brought under control. The international nature
of the industry and the international complexion of the problems both
indicate, therefore, the need for an international control organization
to (1) protect the shipping public against the monopoly powers of
shipping conferences; (2) help rationalize the economic forces of supply
and demand where ordinary competitive practices fail to make the
necessary adjustments with sufficient rapidity; and (3) coordinate
national maritime policies.
However, even if all the political problems were solved and national
rivalries for power were eliminated, the international regulation of the
commercial aspects of shipping would still be extremely complicated
and difficult. These difficulties are well illustrated by the experience
of the United States in its efforts to regulate the international shipping
which is engaged in transporting its foreign trade. As this country's
program for the regulation of shipping rates and practices has been one
of the most ambitious undertaken, a discussion of the procedure fol-
lowed and of some of the results achieved will shed considerable light
on the advantages and shortcomings of unilateral regulation of ship-
ping, and should also illuminate some of the problems that will con-
front multilateral regulation by an international organization.
III
Several agencies of the United States Government have regulatory
authority over the shipping industry. Safety and certain technical
matters, for example, have been handled by the Bureau of Steamboat
Inspection and Navigation and by the Coast Guard. The regulation
of rates and commercial practices, however, has been under the juris-
diction of the United States Maritime Commission, which, when
created in 1936, fell heir to the powers previously exercised by the
United States Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Com-
merce, which in turn had inherited the authority of the United States
Shipping Board. Each agency in turn received new powers of its owm.
REGULATORY LEGISLATION
The earliest legislation directly regulating the rates and practices of
water carriers as such was the Shipping Act of 1916, providing for
supervision of common carriers operating on regular routes on the
high seas and Great Lakes (1) in the foreign trade of the United States
(except ferry boats) and (2) in both interstate and non-contiguous
domestic trade." Similar supervision was provided over persons
11. 39 STAT. 728 (1917), 40 STAT. 900 (1919), 46 U. S. C. § S01 (1940). Authority over
interstate carriers by water was transferred to the Interstate Commerce Cormkzion by
the Transportation Act of 1940,54 STAT. 933 (1941), 49 U.S. C. § 904 (1940).
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carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock,
warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common
carrier by water on the high seas or Great Lakes."
In international shipping the Act prohibits (1) deferred rebates,
(2) "fighting ships," 13 (3) retaliation or discrimination against any
shipper, and (4) unfair or unjustly discriminatory contracts with any
shipper. A fine of not more than $25,000 for each offense is provided
as the penalty for a breach of these provisions." If water carriers-
other than citizens of the United States-violate the foregoing pro-
visions or deny an American common carrier admission to a conference
on equal terms with all other parties, the Secretary of Commerce, upon
certification by the Commission, is empowered to bar vessels of the
offending parties from United States ports.'"
Agreements between parties subject to the Act or changes in earlier
agreements must be filed with the Commission. The Commission may
disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement or modification thereof
deemed to operate to the detriment of United States commerce, to be
in violation of the Act or to be "unjustly discriminatory or unfair"
between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between
exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors. Ap-
proved agreements are exempted from the Anti-Trust laws. Violators
are subject to a fine of $1000 for each day of the offense. 16
It is unlawful (1) to give unreasonable preference to any person,
locality, or description of traffic, or to subject any of the foregoing to
undue disadvantage; (2) to permit by false billing, weighing, etc.,
transportation at less than regular rates; (3) to influence insurance
companies to discriminate against a competitor; and (4) to disclose
information detrimental to shippers or consignees. 7 It is also unlawful
for any shipper, consignor, or consignee to obtain or attempt to obtain
by false billing, false weighing, etc., rates less than otherwise applicable.
A fine of not more than $5000 is provided for each offense.'"
The charging of rates or fares which are "unjustly discriminatory"
between shippers or ports, or "unjustly prejudicial" to United States
exporters compared to their foreign competitors, is prohibited, and the
Commission is empowered to alter rates which are in violation of this
12. Ibid.
13. A "fighting ship" is a vessel placed on berth by one or more established lines which
quotes lower rates than its sponsors with the intention of rendering the entry of a newcomer
to the route difficult.
14. 39 STAT. 733 (1917), 41 STAT. 996 (1921), 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1940).
15. 39 STAT. 733 (1917), 41 STAT. 996 (1921), 46 U. S. C. § 813 (1940).
16. 39 STAT. 733 (1917), 46 U. S. C. § 814 (1940).
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section. Reasonable regulations covering practices relating to receiv-
ing, handling, storing or delivery of property must be observed, 1 and
the Commission has authority to require the filing of reports, records,
etc., of any person subject to the Act.'- The Commission is also au-
thorized to investigate any violation of the Act on its own volition, or
to do so upon a complaint filed by any person. In the latter case full
reparation for injury may be awarded if the complaint is filed within
two years after the cause of action accrues. 2 1
The main provisions of the 1920 Act concerned the continued opera-
tion of war-built American vessels by the Shipping Board and their
ultimate sale to private operators. Section 19 of the Act, however,
authorizes the Commission to make such rules and regulations affecting
shipping in foreign trade as are necessary to meet unfavorable condi-
tions resulting from foreign rules or laws or from competitive methods
of foreign ship operators or their agents. 22
The principal purpose of the 1936 Act was promotional, but in addi-
tion to transferring to the Maritime Commission the regulatory powers
described above, the 1936 Act contained two new regulatory provisions.
The Act made it unlawful for a common carrier by water to prevent or
attempt to prevent any other such carrier from serving a port within
the continental limits of the United States, designed for the accommo-
dation of ocean-going vessels, when an improvement project for such
port had been authorized by Congress..2 3 (This example of local favor-
itism had been engineered by a few recently-developed outports seeking
to assure themselves of direct water service at terminal rates regardless
of whether or not it was economical from an operating point of view.)
The 1936 Act also authorized the Commission to investigate discrimi-
natory rates and practices whereby American exporters are required to
pay a common carrier in the foreign trade of the United States a higher
rate to a foreign port than the rate charged by such carrier on similar
cargo from the foreign port to such United States port.24 Pursuant to
this authority, a study was made by the Commission in its first year
leading to the conclusion that services and conditions in the import
and export trade are so different that no decision regarding discrimina-
tion could be drawn. 25
REGULATORY PROCEDURE
In 1940, an investigation of administrative procedure in government
agencies conducted by a comnlittee appointed by the Attorney-Ge-neral
19. 39 STAT. 734 (1917), 46 U. S. C. § 816 (1940).
20. 39 STAT. 736 (1917), 46 U. S. C. § 820 (1940).
21. 39 STAT. 736 (1917), 46 U. S. C. § 821 (1940).
22. 41 STAT. 995 (1921), 46 U. S. C. § 876 (1940).
23. 49 STAT. 1987 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 1115 (1940).
24. 49 STAT. 1990 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 1122 (1940).
25. REP. MARIun COM.nx. (1937) 17.
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found little to criticize in the Maritime Commission's regulatory pro-
cedure.21 Certain recommendations to extend the use of informal
methods of adjudication and the use of a shortened procedure similar
to that utilized by the Interstate Commerce Commission were incor-
porated by the Maritime Commission, and accordingly it was given a
"clean bill of health" by the Attorney-General's committee in their
final report in 1941.27 One reason for the Maritime Commission's
successful administration of its regulatory powers was no doubt due to
the fact that the Commission and its predecessors had borrowed
heavily from the Interstate Commerce Commission. s
Formal Docket. The procedure in the case of formal dockets is quite
similar to that before a United States district court sitting as a court
of equity. Formal complaints are filed and served on the respondent,
and an opportunity is afforded to respond to the complaint. An exami-
ner, whose duties are very similar to those of a master in chancery, is
appointed by the Commission to hear evidence and report his findings.
Exceptions to the findings of the examiner are then heard before a
committee appointed by the Commission for the purpose, and the
Commission finally considers the record of the case and issues a report
containing its findings, and if necessary issues a formal order. Even in
investigations initiated by the Commission there is an element of an
adversary nature; one section of the Commission's legal staff prosecutes
the case, while another section of the staff advises the Commissioners
as to the merits of the case and its proper disposition. The same counsel
who conducts the case for the Government does not advise the Com-
mission. As a result of such hearings orders are issued (1) to cease and
desist from an unlawful practice, (2) to fix a rule governing future
practices of respondent and other carriers, and (3) to pay reparation
for injury caused by unlawful acts or practices.29 During the fiscal
year 1941, a shortened procedure was introduced, whereby complaints
are disposed of upon the submission of evidence under oath by mem-
oranda, thereby avoiding the need of a hearing.
Informal and Special Dockets. The Commission also maintains an
informal docket to assist shippers, carriers, and other persons in the
adjustment of controversies which arise in regard to rates, fares and
other charges. Informal complaints are handled by correspondence or
adjusted through informal conference, thereby avoiding the delay and
expense incident to formal procedure.
A special docket is maintained to permit reparations to shippers
where carriers believe that the charges they have collected for trans-
26. SEN. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) Part 4.
27. SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 189.
28. SEN. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) Part 4 at 3.
29. Cunningham, The U. S. Maritime Commission-A Study in Administrative Law
(Unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School Library, 1939) 70-8.
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portation are unlawful. Applications for such authorization must
admit that the rate charged was unreasonable, and are considered the
equivalent of informal complaints. Careful consideration is given them
in order to avoid the possibility of granting rebates to favored shippers.
Section 15 Agreements. Under Section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916,
common water carriers and other persons subject to the Act are re-
quired to file for approval a true copy, or if oral, a true and complete
memorandum of every agreement with any other such carrier or such
person to which it may be a party, fixing or regulating rates; or con-
trolling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition; or allocating
ports or restricting or otherwise regulating sailings; or in any manner
providing for a cooperative working arrangement. All such agree-
ments, modifications, or cancellations are subjected to analysis and, if
found to be unexceptionable, are approved as a routine matter. (Great
care is taken to assure the accurate expression of intent of the parties
filing the agreement. Thus, the Commission exercises a combination
of regulatory and service functions.) If a protest against approval of
an agreement is received, examination is more critical. In all cases an
effort is made to reach informally a solution satisfactory to all. If a
proper solution cannot be achieved in this manner, a formal hearing is
scheduled.
Filing of Tariffs. The Commission requires all conferences to file
their tariffs as an administrative matter in its supervision of Section 15
agreements. However, as not all common carriers by vrater are mem-
bers of shipping conferences, it has been necessary to supplement this
requirement. Under a regulation issued by the United States Shipping
Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce in 1935, common water
carriers in foreign commerce are required to file with the Commission
tariffs covering the transportation of property, except bulk cargoes,
from the continental United States to foreign ports.-" Such tariffs
have to be filed within thirty days of their effective date. Bill-of-lading
'forms are also filed under regulations prescribed by the Commission.
Pursuant to an order issued by the Commission on January 26, 1939,
common carriers are required to file their rates and charges on cargo,
other than bulk cargo, transported from the East Coast of South
30. Investigation of § 19 of Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 1 U. S. S. B. B. 470, 502-3
(1935); Isbrandtsen-Aloller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139 (1937). (In this article,
reports of the United States Shipping Board vAill be designated by the letters U. S. S. B.;
reports of the United States Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce wll
be indicated by U. S. S. B. B.; and reports of the United States Mlaritime Commiszion v.'iU
be designated by U. S. Ml. C. In the text, the United States Shipping Board vil be referred
to as the Board; the United States Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce
will be called the Bureau; and the United States Maritime Comwinson vl be dezignated
as the Commission.)
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America to the Pacific Coast of the United States.3 Other lines and
conferences frequently file import rates voluntarily.
If the Commission doubts the reasonableness or lawfulness of the
tariffs filed, or if a protest is received, the Commission attempts to
effect a settlement by informal means. In most cases, carriers have
voluntarily made the necessary corrections upon informal notification
by the Commission. If this fails, a suspension may be ordered and a
formal hearing scheduled, or the Commission may permit the tariff to
become operative without delay, and schedule hearings for a subse-
quent time.
REPORTS
American experience with the regulation of domestic trade, over
which the government has had maximum and minimum rate control,
is more complete than that with the regulation of shipping in foreign
trade. Nevertheless, a considerable body of cases concerned with car-
riers operating in the foreign trades is available. Furthermore, many
of the Commission's powers are applicable to carriers in both the for-
eign and domestic trades; therefore, cases involving domestic carriers
occasionally evolve principles apposite to carriers in the foreign
trades.3 2 The narrowness of the Commission's legal authority im-
plicitly limits its regulatory decisions. The Commission possesses no
mandate to consider the broader social and economic consequences of
its actions, 33 nor the impact of its decisions on international economic
and political relations. Its primary function is to promote American
flag shipping and commerce.
The Commission's policy is to base decisions on the facts of record
in each case, and it maintains that findings in connection with similar
practices do not have the force of law in subsequent proceedings in-
volving different carriers, different trades, different competitive condi-
tions, or different statutory provisions.3 4 Despite this alleged policy of
considering each case 'in vacuo certain general principles can be traced,
although they should not be regarded as established precedents pos-
sessing the force of law.
31. In the Matter of Rates, Charges, and Practices of Yamashita Kisen Kabushilki
Kaisha and Osaka Syosen Kabusiki Kaisya, 2 U. S. M. C. 14 (1939).
32. Note the similarities between § 18 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 39 STAT, 735 (1916),
46 U. S. C. § 817 (1940) (domestic carriers) and § 17 of the Act, 39 STAT. 734-5 (1916),
46 U. S. C § 816 (1940) (foreign carriers).
33. But see Ames Harris Neville v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. M. C.
765 (1938) (anti-monopoly policy invoked), discussed infra, at 1227, and see discussion of the
Commission's assumption of authority to consider the reasonableness of conference rates
infra, at 1228.
34. Los Angeles By-Products Co. v. Barber Steamship Lines, 2 U. S. M. C. 106, 115
(1939).
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Standards of Reasonableness.5 The Commission's predecessors de-
voted considerable attention to evaluating general factors pertinent to
the reasonableness of rates and practices. Value of service was early
recognized as a factor to be considered in rate determination," although
not conclusive when considered alone.Y Cost'of service was also recog-
nized as an important criterion, so that a justifiable rate for a cheap
article might be greater in proportion to its value than the rate for a
high-priced article.35 But a carrier was held not justified in burdening
a port with a differential for the sole reason that the cost of operation
from that port is greater than from some other port; such elements as
volume of traffic, competition, distance, advantages of location, charac-
ter of traffic, frequency of service, and others were deemed to merit
consideration. 39 However, reasonableness of rates is not to be gauged
by the ability of shippers to market their products with profit."
The reasonableness of passenger fares has been considered in only
one case. In 1934, the Bureau held that classification of passenger fares
should depend not only on location and type of space, but also on sen-
ice, freedom of the ship, and age, size, speed and itinerary of the
vessel. 4'
The rates of other carriers and services are not determinative of the
reasonableness of water carrier rates. Export rates higher than import
rates have been held not unreasonable if the import volume is far
greater and there is no proof that reduced exports' rate would produce
a comparable volume.42 In 1939, the Commission held that joint
through rates greater than a combination of locals and transfer charges
did not violate the Act, since the conference controlling the through
rates did not control the local rates.43
Questions of services which water carriers should perform without
charge, and of what constitutes reasonable charges for services that
need not be included in the transportation rate, have been adjudicated
frequently. The Bureau inclined to the view that the published rate
must be all inclusive. In 1935, in Re Assembling and Distributing
35. Several of the cases discussed under this heading ako involve considerations of
undue preference and prejudice.
36. Judson L. Thomson Manufacturing Co. v. Eastern Steamship Lines, 1 U. S. S. B.
s (1924).
37. Dobler & Mudge v. Panama Rail Road Steamship Line, 1 U. S. S. B. 130 (1927).
38. Atlas Waste Manufacturing Co. v. The New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co.,
1 U. S. S. B. 195 (1931).
39. Port Utilities Commission of Charleston, S. C. v. The Carolina Co., 1 U. S. S. B.
61, 71-2 (1925).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Passenger Classifications and Fares, American Line Steamship Corp., 1 U.S. S. B. B.
294, 302-5 (1934).
42. Edmond Well v. Italian Line, 1 U. S. S. B. B. 395 (1935).
43. Neuss, Hesslin v. Grace Line, 2 U. S. M. C. 3 (1939).
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Charge,44 it held that the carriers' undertaking was not only to transport
cargo but also to present it in a deliverable state, and therefore the
carriers cannot charge for assembling and distributing services at one
port when they customarily provide such services without additional
compensation elsewhere. Similarly, it was held that no charge could be
made for the issuance of bills of lading because this was part of the
common carrier service. 4" The Commission, after a decision that
carriers are obliged to mail arrival notices without charge, 4 came to
the conclusion that nothing in the Shipping Acts prohibits carriers from
dividing their rates for different services performed, nor requires them
to publish their charges in single amounts. 4 Following a 1939 rehearing
of the Assembling and Distributing case, 4 the Commission overruled
its predecessor and held that a carrier is entitled to compensation for
any transportation services rendered. The fact that all parties were
benefited by the delivery and receipt of general cargo at place of rest
on dock instead of at end of ship's tackle could not operate to prohibit
the carriers from charging for the services actually rendered in perform-
ing the handling beyond ship's tackle, when, as here, it was not shown
that the published tackle-to-tackle rates included compensation for
further services or were in excess of fair and reasonable rates for the
tackle-to-tackle service actually rendered. In 1940, the Supreme Court
sustained the Commission's view that the separation of charges by
water carriers to show costs beyond ship's tackle is lawful. 9
To grant excessive free-time storage has been held unlawful, the
Commission stating that only such free time should be allowed as may
be reasonably required for the removal of property, the criterion of
reasonableness being transportation necessity and not commercial con-
venience." Subsequently, nominal charges on coffee were held in vio-
lation of the foregoing decision, as coffee did not share the proper
burden of preventing pier congestion."
Undue prejudice, preference and discrimination. Along with cases
involving the reasonableness of rates, questions of undue prejudice,
preference and discrimination were among the earliest problems re-
quiring the Board's attention. In 1936, the Bureau indicated the
general philosophy that the existence of unjust discrimination and
44. 1 U. S. S. B. B. 380 (1935).
45. In re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements, I U. S. S. B. B. 533 (1936).
46. Intercoastal Segregation Rules, I U. S. M. C. 725, 733 (1937).
47. Los Angeles By-Products Co. v. Barber Steamship Lines, 2 U. S. M. C, 106, 114
(1939).
48. J. G. Boswell Co. v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 2 U. S. M. C. 95 (1939),
Los Angeles By-Products Co. v. Barber Steamship Lines, 2 U. S. M. C. 106 (1939).
49. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers Ass'n v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 959 (N. D. Cal.
1940), aff'd 312 U. S. 667 (1941).
50. Storage of Import Property, 1 U. S. M. C. 676, 682 (1937).
51. Storage Charges Under Agreements 6205 and 6215, 2 U. S. M. C. 48 (1939).
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undue prejudice and preference is a question of fact which must be
clearly demonstrated by substantial proof.52 Acceptable evidence from
which to infer the unreasonable or prejudicial nature of rates may
include showing a differential not justified by cost, value of service, or
other transportation conditions. 3 However, the Acts do not afford
relief from disadvantages inherent in geography.14 Different port con-
ditions and facilities, warranting different methods of handling cargo,
may justify differential charges. 5 The advantage which comes to a
shipper merely from the location of his plant does not constitute an
illegal preference." Accordingly, rates to Hawaii from Gulf and At-
lantic ports, higher than those from Pacific ports, have been held
lawful. 57
In 1936, the Bureau held that prejudice to one shipper, to be undue,
must ordinarily be such that it shall be a source of positive advantage
to another shipper.-" This principle received specific illustration in
several cases involving minimum weights. For example, rates based on
minimum weights so large as to be available to one shipper only consti-
tute undue and unreasonable preference," and quantity discount rules
in the intercoastal trade are unjustly discriminatory. 2 Moreover,
where the prevailing shipping quantity is small, even though carload
lots are offered by some shippers, any-quantity rates are consonant
with anti-monopoly policy as they protect small shippers.cl
Underquoting any rate which other carriers quote, and the use of
rate cutting as a club to compel other carriers to adopt pooling agree-
ments, rate differentials, or other measures have been held unfair prac-
tices and detrimental to American commerce.Y- Similarly, the refusal of
conference lines to accept cargo from a certain shipper when space was
available was discriminatory and in violation of the lay,%,A3 (Eventually
52. Philadelphia Ocean Traffic Bureau v. The Export Steamship Corp., 1 U. S. S. B. B.
538 (1936).
53. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Ellerman & Buclmall, 1 U. S. S. B. 242, 250 (1932).
54. Sharp Paper & Specialty Co. v. Dollar Steamship Lines, 2 U. S. M. C. 91 (1939).
55. Foreign Trade Bureau New Orleans Association of Commerce v. Ban!: Line,
1 U. S. S. B. 177, 185-6 (1930).
56. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Ellerman & Buckmall, 1 U. S. S. B. 242, 251 (1932).
57. See note 55 supra.
58. California Pacldng Co. v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. S. B. B. 543
(1936).
59. Intercoastal Rates of American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. S. B. B. 349 (1934).
60. Transportation of Lumber Through Panama Canal, 1 U. S. M. C. 646 (1937).
61. Ames Harris Nerille Co. v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. M. C. 765
(1938).
62. Section 19 Investigation, 1935, 1 U. S.. B. B. 470,498 (1935).
63. Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellkchaft, M. B. H.,
1 U. S. M. C. 6S6 (1937).
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a reparation of over $25,000, the largest amount ever involved in a
Commission reparation case, was awarded.) 6
In 1940, the Commission on its own initiative, instituted investiga-
tions into false billing and misdescriptions of cargo. Nine of fourteen
respondent carriers were found to allow shippers to obtain transporta-
tion from Japan to the United States at less than regular rates by
means of false billing,65 and a fine of $5,250 was assessed. Nine
shippers and six carriers were found to have violated the Shipping Acts
by misdescribing shipments from New York to the Philippine Islands."7
In 1942 the Commission held that "brokerage" payments to shippers
were unlawful methods of reducing freight rates.63
Conference and Other Section x.5 Agreements. Although there is no
specific statutory provision authorizing the Commission to pass upon
the reasonableness of rates established by conferences in the foreign-
trade, the Commission found an opportunity to influence such rates
in its power to disapprove the conference agreement. If the Commis-
sion disapproves the agreement, the parties thereto are compelled to
operate individually, and thereby lose the advantages of the conference
system. This method of influencing rates was first employed by the
Bureau in 1935, when it held that upon a showing that a conference
rate in foreign commerce is unreasonably high, its reduction to a proper
level will be required; if necessary, approval of the conference agree-
ment will be withdrawn. 9 This was a considerable departure from the
earlier attitude that in Section 15 Congress had given sanction and
encouragement to conferences, as the benefits from them to shippers
are often as great as the benefits accruing to the carrier members, and
therefore it was the Board's function to afford relief only from actual
and not from theoretical wrongs arising from such agreements."
In 1938, the Commission considered the agreement between the
Matson Navigation Company and the Dollar Steamship Lines,"
whereby Matson agreed not to operate to the Far East in return for
Dollar's agreement not to solicit traffic between the Pacific Coast and
the Hawaiian Islands and to pay Matson fifty per cent of such business
that Dollar happened to carry. The Commission held, over the dissent
64. Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, M, B. H.,
2 U. S. M. C. 62 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F. Supp. 76 (S. D. N. Y. 1940), rev'd on
other grounds, 116 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied sub nor. Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Maritima v. Roberto Hernandez, 313 U. S. 582 (1941).
65. Rates from Japan to United States, 2 U. S. M. C. 426 (1940).
66. U. S. Maritime Commission Press Release No. 869, March 21, 1941.
67. Rates from United States to Phillippine Islands, 2 U. S. M. C. 535 (1941).
68. Rates, Charges, & Practices of L. & A. Garcia and Co., 2 U. S. M. C. 615 (1941).
69. Edmond Weil v. Italian Line "Italia," 1 U. S. S. B. B. 395 (1935).
70. In re Rates in Canadian Currency, 1 U. S. S. B. 264, 281 (1933).
71. In the Matter of Dollar-Matson Agreements, 1 U. S. M. C. 750 (1938), f.f'd on
rehearing, 2 U. S. M. C. 387 (1940).
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of two Commissioners, that agreements restricting competition should
be of definite duration and for reasonably short periods, so that the
parties concerned and the Commission would have an opportunity to
consider changed conditions. The Commission continued that the
exemption from the Anti-Trust laws granted by Section 15 is intcnded
to permit water carriers to regulate competition so as to eliminate rate-
cutting and other abuses injurious to shipper and carrier alike, but is
not intended to foster monopoly. In a subsequent case, the Commis-
sion held that the advantages of group rate action and exemption from
the Anti-Trust laws require conferences to consider shipper needs and
provide an opportunity for an exchange of views with their customers.72
As "fighting" ships and deferred rebates were prohibited by the 1916
Act, contract rates came to be widely used in the foreign trades of the
United States. 73 In 1922, the Board decided that contract rates were
in violation of the 1916 Act, where a single line operated in the trade,7
4
but in 1933 it upheld the practice where more than one line quoted the
contract rates and new lines could join the conference if they so de-
sired.7 5 By the outbreak of World War I I, sixty-eight conferences in
the foreign trade of this country were employing the contract rate
system.7 6
The Commission formalized and refined the holdings as to contract
rates. In a case involving the right of lines operating from United States
North Atlantic ports to the European range to prevent contract
shippers located in the interior of this country from patronizirg vessels
which called directly at Great Lakes ports, the Commission pointed out
that the contract rate system in foreign commerce is not unlawful
per se, but is condemned where it operates solely to effect a monopoly.
Since the North Atlantic lines carried more than eighty per cent of the
traffic originating in the Great Lakes area, it was held that they had a
practical monopoly and that a difference in rates for identical services
based solely upon whether the carriers secure the shippers' entire
patronage was prima facie discriminatory." In the instant case, the
discrimination was undue and unreasonable, since the flow of traffic
was not naturally tributary to the North Atlantic lines, and the same
72. Pacific Coast-European Rates & Practices, 2 U. S. 11. C. 58 (1939).
73. Contract rates grant shippers who agree to patronize conference lines e:xclu~ively
for an agreed period of time lower rates than shippers who do not enter such an agreement.
This differs from the deferred rebate system, which is widely used abroad, in that the latter
arrangement requires the shipper to give the contract carriers his busines3 during a p.riod
of deferment as well.
74. Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & Steamship Co., 1 U. S. S. B. 41 (1922).
75. Rawleigh v. Stoomvart, 1 U. S. S. B. 285 (1933).
76. IrrEa-AmHEcAN MARITIME CONFERENCE (Nov. 25-Dec. 2, 1940) REronT o' Tim
DELEGATES OF THE UNITED STATES (1941) 176.
77. Note influence of Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
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shippers were permitted to use the Gulf routes to Europe without
jeopardizing their contracts."
The exclusion of applicants from conference membership has posed a
series of questions. The Commission has stated that its policy is to
require in all conference agreements a clause permitting the admission
as a conference member of any line seeking admission on equal terms,
but that this does not mean that a ship operator can become a member
merely by requesting admission. 9 The decisions, however, do not indi-
cate a consistently-applied regulatory philosophy so much as a response
to expediency, particularly where contract rates or war conditions
enter the picture.
As early as 1925 the Board held an agreement between three separate
conferences unfair to the carriers and detrimental to American com-
merce because the admittance of a new member line required the
unanimous vote of all parties."0 Voting provisions have been rejected
which gave a conference control of traffic moving over routes in which
none of its members participated,"' and which-permitted inactive mem-
bers of a conference to vote to exclude a new member who would actu-
ally operate in the trade.82
Exclusion of an applicant who would charge ten per cent less than
conference rates has been sustained where there was no proof that a
differential was justified and the existing members did not have a
monopoly. 3 Refusal of membership on the grounds the applicant was
not a common carrier actually operating in the trade has been held not
to result in discrimination, undue prejudice, or detriment to the com-
merce of the United States,8 4 even where the applicant did not at the
time operate in the trade because contract rates prevented operation
except at a substantial loss.' Similarly, where previous contract com-
mitments obligated the applicant to charge lower than conference
rates, exclusion by the conference was permitted.8" In 1939 and 1940,
however, the Commission moved toward a more liberal attitude by
holding that conference membership cannot be denied because of the
adequacy of existing services, for carriers in the trade could thereby
78. Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U. S. M. C. 220, 225-6 (1939).
79. INTER-AmERICANr MARITIME CONFERENCE, op. cit. supra note 76, at 175.
80. The Port Differential Investigation, 1 U. S. S. B. 61, Order for Docket No. 26
(1925).
81. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Colombian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. M. C. 711, 718
(1938).
82. Sprague Steamship Agency v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 2 U. S. M. C. 72 (1939).
83. Wessel, Duval & Co. v. Colombian Steamship Co., 1 U. S. S. B. B. 390 (1935).
84. Hind, Rolph & Co. v. French Line, 2 U. S. M. C. 138 (1939).
85. In the Matter of Gulf Intercoastal Conference Agreement, 1 U. S. S. B. B. 322
(1934).
86. Application of G. B. Thorden for Conference Membership, 2 U. S. M. C. 77 (1939).
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perpetuate monopoly by continuing to maintain adequate service.P
The Commission maintained that the test for admittance to conference
membership cannot be the same as that for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity because (1) the Commission has no such express
power and (2) it would be illogical to imply such power after a Federal
District Court had denied the Commission the right to prevent aban-
donment of service.83 In 1940, the Commission stated that the an-
nouncement of a proposed service, the publication of sailing schedules,
and the solicitation of cargoes resulting in common carrier commit-
ments are sufficient to qualify a line to submit an application for mem-
bership in a conference. 9 However, repeated reference to the existence
of contract rates in the former, and war conditions in the latter, in-
stances makes the precise bases of the decisions unclear.
Pooling. In 1939, the Commission upheld an agreement to pool
earnings in the United States North Atlantic-Germany run, because the
result of the agreement was effective control of destructive competition
without introducing unfair discrimination or being detrimental to
American commerce."
IV
The complexities of regulating commercial practices in the shipping
industry are apparent from even a brief review of United States Mari-
time Commission decisions. A relatively permanent world surplus of
tonnage seems likely and, since the surplus is induced by political as
well as commercial stimuli, adjustment to demand cannot be accom-
plished even in theory through free competition. Nor can such private
organizations as shipping conferences and pools be expected to control
the industry with due regard for the interests of competitiors, shippers
and the public. The conference devices which the Maritime Commis-
sion has approved as not unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or
detrimental to American commerce are only a short step removed from
being devices which would secure a monopoly position to conference
members. The chastening effect of competition from free-lance tramp
vessels, while of salutary effect upon conference and pooling arrange-
ments, has generally not been sufficient and holds little promise for the
future in view of the declining importance of tramp shipping relative
to liner service. Consequently, governmental or inter-governmental
regulation of some sort appears necessary.
However, unilateral regulation by individual nations is inadequate,
since such regulation can attack only a segment of the commercial
87. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Arnold Bernstein Line, 2 U. S. AT. C. 238 (1939).
88. McCormick Steamship Co. v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 45 (N. D. Cal. 1936).
89. Cosmopolitan Line v. Black Diamond Lines, 2 U. S. l. C. 321, 328 (1940).
90. Agreements 1438 and 5260-4, 2 U.S. Al. C. 228 (1939).
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problem and cannot reconcile the conflicting maritime aspirations of
the various nations. While the defects of unilateral regulation might
conceivably be diminished by multilateral regulation pursuant to
international treaty, the effectiveness of such a cure seems slight. If
only major shipping nations participate, multilateral regulation may
easily become a tool for forwarding the maritime interests of the par-
ticipating nations and crushing the shipping and trading interests of
non-participants. If all major shipping nations do not participate,
multilateral regulation can achieve only minor success.
Therefore, it appears that only an international agency of world-wide
scope can effectively minimize conflicting nationalistic ambitions for
commerce and security and at the same time preserve world ship-
ping from chronic depression or monopoly control. Logically, such
an agency should be affiliated with the United Nations. In so far as it
regulates trade rivalries and commercial practices, the shipping au-
thority should be integrated with the Economic and Social Council,
while insofar as it is concerned with the military and naval aspects of
shipping, the Security Council would appear to have primary claim.
It seems advisable for such an international agency to make use of
many of the existing arrangements that regulate and control shipping
affairs, either by integrating the present bodies into the new organiza-
tion, or by drawing on their experience and procedures. Some extant
technical and legal supervisory bodies could well be continued subject
to appropriate oversight by the international agency. Regulation of
commercial practices might well follow the precedents of the United
States Maritime Commission, the Tramp Shipping Administrative
Committee, the International Tanker Pool, etc., and thereby re-
tain much of the flexibility of regular commercial operation-an im-
portant desideratum whether merchant shipping is privately or govern-
mentally owned and operated. The international agency would, of
course, face new and infinitely complex problems of regional competi-
tion, the intensity of which would be heightened by nationalism and
colored by conflicting political aspirations. Consequently, techniques
of control would have to be developed to meet the expanded scope of
the problem attacked and the solution contemplated. Even here,
however, the pattern set by existing regulatory bodies suggests valu-
able precedents.
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